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Abstract
This Note argues that foreign sovereign defendants should be accorded pro se status in federal
courts to contest jurisdiction, subject to the discretion of the court. Part I examines the problems
faced by foreign sovereigns being sued in United States federal courts. Part II analyzes pro se
representations and the policies underlying limitations on its use. Part III presents rationales in
support of pro se representation by foreign states and proposes factors for courts to consider in
determining the propriety of pro se representation.
NOTES
THE RIGHT OF FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS TO CONTEST
FEDERAL COURT JURISDICTION PRO SE
INTRODUCTION
The United States federal courts have not articulated a co-
herent policy for permitting foreign sovereigns to proceed pro
se' in United States courts to contest threshold issues of juris-
diction under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 19762
("FSIA" or "the Act"). Although federal courts generally al-
low foreign sovereigns to appear pro se,3 the courts have not
reconciled such representation with traditional limitations on
pro se representation.4 The FSIA provides for the immunity of
foreign states 5 from suit in United States courts except in cer-
tain limited and specifically enumerated circumstances. The
problem faced by foreign sovereigns being sued in United
States courts is how to assert an immunity defense without hav-
ing to employ local counsel, thereby incurring considerable
legal expenses. For instance, in one case, the United Mexican
States ("Mexico") paid between US$200,000 and US$300,000
in legal fees to contest jurisdiction under the FSIA. The
I. Pro se, which literally means "for himself, in his own behalf," applies to situa-
tions in which an individual appears in court without retaining an attorney. BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1099 (5th ed. 1979). While in propria persona is often used inter-
changeably with pro se, the former phrase means "in one's own proper person" and
has historically had a meaning distinct from pro se. Id. at 712.
2. Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332, 1391.
1441(d), 1602-1611 (1982)).
3. See infra notes 29, 37 & 45 and accompanying text.
4. See itfra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
5. Sovereign immunity, in the context of international law, is a doctrine under
which domestic courts relinquish jurisdiction over a foreign state in appropriate cir-
cumstances. Sovereign immunity differs from diplomatic immunity; the latter in-
volves situations in which an individual diplomat is being sued rather than the sover-
eign. See HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, JURISDICTION OF UNITED STATES COURTS
IN SUITS AGAINST FOREIGN STATES, H.R. REP. No. 1487, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. at 8
(1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1487], reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 6604, 6606; I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAl. LAW 330-34
(3d ed. 1979).
6. Telephone interview with Miguel Angel Gonzalez-Felix, Coordinator General
For Litigation Abroad, Legal Advisor's Office, Mexican Secretariat for Foreign Rela-
tions UJan. I1, 1988) [hereinafter Gonzalez-Felix Interview] (author's notes available
at the Fordham International Law Jo rnal office). The case involved was Asociacion de
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Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the
lower court's dismissal of the case, noting that the conduct
complained of clearly lacked the required nexus with the
United States.7
This Note argues that foreign sovereign defendants
should be accorded pro se status in federal courts to contest
jurisdiction, subject to the discretion of the court. Part I exam-
ines the problems faced by foreign sovereigns being sued in
United States federal courts. Part II analyzes pro se representa-
tion and the policies underlying limitations on its use. Part III
presents rationales in support of pro se representation by for-
eign states and proposes factors for courts to consider in de-
termining the propriety of pro se representation.
I. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IN UNITED
STATES COURTS
In abrogating the sovereign immunity of foreign nations
in several express instances, the FSIA discontinued the role
previously played by the State Department of minimizing
claims brought against sovereign defendants. The burden now
rests with foreign sovereign defendants to assert an immunity
defense, often at great expense and without regard to the mer-
its of the claim.
A. Immunity Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
For a plaintiff to proceed against a foreign nation in
United States courts,8 a court must have subject matter and
personal jurisdiction according to the provisions of the FSIA."
Reclamantes v. United Mexican States, 561 F. Supp. 1190 (D.D.C. 1983), aff'd, 735
F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051 (1985).
7. Reclamantes, 735 F.2d at 1524. In granting Mexico's motion to dismiss, the
trial court noted that "[n]either the United States nor an appropriate legal forum
within its borders ever found plaintiffs' claims to be legally cognizable." Reclamantes,
561 F. Supp. at 1201. While it seemed quite apparent to the trial court that subject
matter jurisdiction was lacking, plaintiff continued through the appellate process. Id.
at 1195.
8. United States federal courts have original but not exclusive jurisdiction over
claims brought pursuant to the FSIA. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1982). The FSIA pro-
vides for removal of civil actions from state courts to federal courts at the discretion
of the foreign sovereign defendant. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1982). A petition for re-
moval must be filed, however. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 1487, snpra note 5, at 32-33,
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 6631-32; infra note 128.
9. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a)-(b) (1982); H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 5, at 22, re-
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The FSIA provides the exclusive basis for exercising jurisdic-
tion over foreign sovereigns. " '
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA in 1976," the United
States Department of State was permitted to interpose and file
a formal but non-binding suggestion of immunity on the behalf
of foreign states in United States courts. 2 The FSIA, however,
was designed to bring United States practice into conformity
with that of most other nations by leaving sovereign immunity
printed in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6610. It is not clear whether
immunity is a subject matter jurisdiction bar or an affirmative defense or both. The
FSIA explicitly refers to "jurisdictional immunity" in § 1605, 28 U.S.C. § 1605
(1982), and the legislative history states that "jurisdiction extends to any claim with
respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity." H.R. REP. No. 1487,
supra note 5, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6611. How-
ever, the legislative history also characterizes sovereign immunity as an affirmative
defense. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6616. Fur-
ther, "[t]he ultimate burden of proving immunity would rest with the foreign state." Id.
(emphasis added).
As to in personam jurisdiction, § 1330(b) of the Act is, in actuality, a federal
long-arm statute over foreign states. Id. at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6612. The requirements of minimum contacts and adequate notice
are included in the provision. Id. See generally McGee v. International Life Ins. Co.,
355 U.S. 220 (1957); International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a
court to exercise personal jurisdiction over a foreign state under the Act, the foreign
state must not be entitled to immunity under §§ 1605-1607. H.R. REP. No. 1487,
supra note 5, at 13, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6612. In
addition, an appearance by a foreign state does not in itself confer personal jurisdic-
tion. Id. at 14, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs at 6612.
10. Section 1604 provides that "a foreign state shall be immune from the juris-
diction of the courts of the United States and of the States except as provided in
sections 1605 to 1607 of this chapter." 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1982); see Verlinden B.V.
v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 496-97 (1983); Asociacion de Reclamantes
v. United Mexican States, 735 F.2d 1517 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1051
(1985); O'Connell Mach. Co. v. M.V. "Americana", 734 F.2d 115 (2d Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 469 U.S. 1086 (1984); see also Comment, Foreign Sovereign Immunity After Amerada
Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic: Did It Go Down IW'ith the Hercules?. 1I
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 660 (1988). But see Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine
Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425-27 (2d Cir. 1987) (district court has jurisdiction over
foreign sovereign under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1982), if an alien
brings suit against a sovereign, for tort only, that sufficiently alleges a violation of
international law), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 87-1372).
11. The Act was passed on October 21, 1976, and became effective 90 days after
its enactment. See Pub. L. No. 94-583, § 8, 90 Stat. 2891, 2898.
12. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 5, at 8, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6607. However, the Supreme Court in 1943 held that suggestions of
immunity by the executive branch "must be accepted by the courts as a conclusive
determination by the political arm of the Government." Ex parte Republic of Peru,
318 U.S. 578, 588 (1943).
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determinations exclusively to the courts."3 Thus, the determi-
nation of sovereign immunity was transferred from the execu-
tive branch to the judicial branch. The transfer of immunity
determinations freed the State Department from pressure
from foreign states to recognize their immunity from suit.' 4
The main purpose of the FSIA, however, was to codify the
principle of restrictive sovereign immunity.' 5 According to
this principle, the immunity of a foreign state is restricted to
suits involving a state's public acts (ure imperii) and does not
extend to suits based on commercial or private acts (Yure ges-
tionis).' 6 The State Department adopted the restrictive princi-
ple of sovereign immunity in its so-called Tate Letter of
1952.17
Since the passage of the Act, foreign sovereigns must as-
sert all immunity defenses on their own behalf directly to a
court without the aid of the State Department.' 8 However, the
State Department may appear as amicus curiae in cases of sig-
nificant interest to the United States Government.9'
B. The Foreign Sovereign's Predicament
Pursuant to the FSIA, United States courts cannot exercise
jurisdiction over a foreign state if it is entitled to immunity.
Under the Act, immunity is granted to a foreign sovereign de-
fendant unless the plaintiff alleges claims that fall under one of
the five enumerated exceptions.2z Specifically, a foreign state
is not immune from the jurisdiction of United States courts if:
13. Id. at 12, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6610.
14. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6606.
15. Id., reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6605.
16. Id.; see also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 330-34.
17. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 5, at 8, rep rnted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6607 (citing letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Adviser, United
States Department of State, to Philip B. Perlman, Acting Attorney General (May 19,
1952), repinted in 26 DEP'T STATE BULL. 984 (1952)).
18. Id. at 7, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6606.
19. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, DIGEST OF U.S. PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 325
(1976). One commentator has suggested that although sovereign immunity determi-
nations now rest with the judicial branch, the fact that the State Department may
intervene, at its discretion, as amicus curiae creates the perception that recommenda-
tions of immunity by the State Department are subject to political considerations.
Gonzalez-Felix, The Foreign Sovereigni Immunities Act.: Fair Play for Foreigni States anid the
Needfor Sonie Procedural Iniprovemeits, 8 Hous. J. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1985).
20. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(l)-(5) (1982). In the context of the FSIA, the issue
of pro se representation is applicable only to foreign sovereign defendants since pro-
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(1) the foreign state has waived immunity;
(2) the action is based upon a commercial activity carried
on in the United States by the foreign state;
(3) rights in property taken in violation of international
law are at stake;
(4) rights in property in the United States acquired by
succession or gifts or rights in immovable property situated in
the United States are in issue; or
(5) money damages are sought against a foreign state for
personal injury or death occurring in the United States and
caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state.2
The burden of affirmatively showing that none of the ex-
ceptions applies in a particular situation-that is, that subject
matter jurisdiction is lacking-rests with the foreign sovereign
defendant. 22 There is no specific provision in the Act permit-
ting courts to dismiss even the most frivolous complaints sua
sponte.2 ' Thus, the foreign sovereign has an initial choice of
either appearing in court and asserting a defense of sovereign
immunity or risking a default.judgment.24
Prior to the enactment of the FSIA, the Department of
ceeding as a plaintiff constitutes a waiver of immunity. See id. § 1605(a)(1); see also I.
BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 322; supra note 9.
21. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(l)-(5).
22. See supra note 9.
23. One commentator has stated that under § 1605 of the Act, courts have the
discretion to dismiss a complaint without an appearance by the foreign state if the
court determines that jurisdiction is lacking. Carl, Suing Foreign Governments inl Ameri-
can Courts: The United States Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act in Practice, 33 Sw. L.J. 1009,
1057 (1979).
For purposes of dismissal, however, allegations in the complaint must be ac-
cepted as true. Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546, 546 (1964) (per curiam). In addition,
courts disfavor dismissal of actions except where the complaint is patently frivolous
on its face or wholly insubstantial. Sexton v. Ryan, 804 F.2d 26, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1986)
(per curiam).
Under the FSIA, a plaintiff need only allege one of the five exceptions Under
§ 1605(a) to establish subject matter jurisdiction. The burden is on the foreign state
to prove that the exception is inapplicable and, accordingly, that subject matterjuris-
diction is lacking. Thus, a court may dismiss a complaint under the FSIA for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction only if the plaintiff fails to allege one of the § 1605 excep-
tions. Cf. Verlinden B.X. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493 n.20 (1983)
(even if a foreign state does not enter an appearance, a district court must still deter-
mine that immunity is unavailable under the Act).
24. Under the FSIA, however, courts can enter default judgments against for-
eign states only when the claimant demonstrates his right to relief by "evidence satis-
factory to the court." 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1982).
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State was permitted to intervene on behalf of the foreign
state.25 Thus, the foreign state did not have to appear in
court.2" One of the roles of the State Department was to mini-
mize the possibility of a foreign state being sued in United
States courts without sufficient cause, as in the case of frivo-
lous, vague, or groundless complaints.2 7 At present, however,
foreign states must respond to all complaints without regard to
the merits of the claims.28
Mexico has aggressively pursued the right to proceed pro
se in United States courts. 29 Mexico has stated that one of the
most significant burdens of defending itself is "the unbearable
cost" of retaining local counsel in the United States to estab-
lish its immunity." Moreover, Mexico has argued that requir-
ing it to protect its interests by employing local counsel would
"cripple its efforts" to defend its sovereignty in the United
States." This sentiment has also been echoed by legal com-
mentators in the United States on the ground that "compelling
a sovereign defendant to retain American counsel imposes an
unjustified burden on foreign nations, especially those third
world countries whose financial resources are limited."3 2
Mexico first proceeded pro se in a United States court in
1977 in Aquino Robles v. Mexicana de Aviacion. Although it was
evident from the pleadings that the court did not have subject
matter jurisdiction under the FSIA, Mexico still had the bur-
25. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
26. Id.
27. Gonzalez-Felix, supra note 19, at 21.
28. Id.
29. Mexico, however, is not the only foreign sovereign that has attempted to
represent itself pro se. In one case, Romania initially appeared pro se to contest per-
sonal jurisdiction in a New York federal court. The court gave no reason why
Romania subsequently retained counsel. East Europe Domestic Int'l Sales Corp. v.
Terra, 467 F. Supp. 383, 385 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 610 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1979).
30. Memorandum of Points and Authorities .in Support of Motion to Restore
Motion to Set Aside Default and Motion to Dismiss to Calendar at 13, The Export
Group v. Reef Indus., No. 84-159 (C.D. Cal. 1986).
31. Id. at 17.
32. Carl, supra note 23, at 1057; see Gonzalez-Felix, supra note 19, at 22.
33. No. 77-50 (Tribunal Superior de Puerto Rico, Sala de San Juan, filedJuly 20,
1977); see Gonzalez-Felix Interview, supra note 6. See generallv Carl, supra note 23, at
1056 (the plaintiff in Aquino Robles sued the Mexican government for alleged false
imprisonment in Mexico; the act complained of was clearly governmental, not com-
mercial in nature).
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den of bringing this fact to the court's attention.3 4 In the in-
terim, Mexico had received an estimate of US$10,000 in legal
fees from American counsel.3 5 Even though subject matter ju-
risdiction was clearly lacking, Mexico found itself faced with
the choice of either paying considerable legal fees to have the
case dismissed or risking a default judgment. In the end, a
Mexican lawyer in the Foreign Ministry prepared a special mo-
tion to dismiss the case and the motion was subsequently
granted by the court. 6
Since the Aquino Robles case, Mexico has been permitted to
proceed pro se in a number of federal courts and has success-
fully contested threshold issues of subject matter and personal
jurisdiction under the FSIA. 7 However, the courts did not ar-
ticulate a policy or rationale for allowing pro se representation
of foreign sovereign defendants in these cases. One Mexican
official stated that Mexico has saved the equivalent of
US$1,300,000 in legal fees by representing itself pro se. 9
Mexico is currently attempting to proceed pro se in the
Southern District of New York40 and has recently been permit-
34. Carl, supra note 23, at 1057.
35. Id. at 1056.
36. Id. at 1056-57.
37. See, e.g., Allen v. United Mexican States, No. 86-0245 (W.D. Okla. Dec. 3,
1987) (Order of Dismissal); Gulf Serv. & Rental, Inc. v. Empresa Mexicana de Trans-
porte Multimodel, S.A. de C.V., No. 87-1367 (E.D. La. Sept. 30, 1987) (Judgment);
Moreno v. Mexican Consulate, No. 87-01769 (C.D. Cal. June 3, 1987) (Order of Dis-
missal); Lucchino v. Foreign Countries, 631 F. Supp. 821 (E.D. Pa. 1986); Security
Pac. Nat'l Bank v. Derderian, No. 85-6970 (C.D. Cal. May 28, 1986) (Order for Dis-
missal); Turner v. State Farm County Mut. Ins. Co., No. 85-34 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 13,
1986) (Order on Pro Se Appearance of Mexico) (Mexico was allowed to proceed pro se
until the court ruled on Mexico's motion to dismiss; the case was ultimately dismissed
on May 22, 1986); International Sewing Supplies Corp. v. Compania de Mexicana
Aviacion, S.A., No. 85-2795 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 1986) (Order Granting Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss); Continental Graphics v. Hiller Indus., No. C83-0602G (D. Utah
Nov. 25, 1985) (Order of Dismissal With Prejudice); Leibsohn v. Republic of Mexico,
No. 84-Z-415 (D. Colo. Feb. 21, 1985) (Order Ruling on Motion to Dismiss).
38. See cases cited supra note 37.
39. This estimate is based on a four-year period from February 1983 to Febru-
ary 1987. Gonzalez-Felix Interview, stupra note 6.
40. See Kline v. Kaneko, No. 87 Civ. 6479 (S.D.N.Y. filed May 21, 1987). Mexico
has moved for dismissal of the claims in Kline. Motion to Dismiss, Kline v. Kaneko
(S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 5, 1987) (No. 87 Civ. 6479). In his papers, the plaintiff in Klie
raised no objection to Mexico's pro se representation. See Memorandum in Opposi-
tion. Kline v. Kaneko (S.D.N.Y. filed Dec. 7, 1987) (No. 87 Civ. 6479). Mexico has
brought the issue of pro se representation before the court. See Motion to Dismiss at
6, 9-11, Kline v. Kaneko (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 5, 1987) (No. 87 Civ. 6479).
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ted to represent itself in the Central District of California.4' In
Gemitsen v. de la Madrid Hurtado,42 at present pending in federal
court in California, the plaintiff alleged that the Mexican con-
sulate staff in Los Angeles unlawfully stopped him from dis-
tributing leaflets critical of the Mexican Government. 43 Ini-
tially, the district court denied Mexico pro se status but dis-
missed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as
pleaded under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a). 44  The district court re-
fused Mexico pro se status on the basis of a local rule prohibit-
ing a corporation or unincorporated organization from ap-
pearing or proceeding pro se." 5 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded the case, finding subject matter juris-
diction under the FSIA."6 Because the district court's denial of
pro se representation was not appealed, the Ninth Circuit did
not specifically address the issue.47  The court did note its
agreement with the district court's denial of pro se status, but
nevertheless allowed the Mexican Consul to appear as an ami-
cus at oral argument. 8
41. See Gerritsen v. de la Madrid Hurtado, 819 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987).
42. 819 F.2d 1511 (9th Cir. 1987).
43. Id. at 1513.
44. Id. at 1513, 1514 n.3. The complaint alleged jurisdiction solely on the basis
of 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (1982), which provides the district courts with original juris-
diction in any civil action to redress the deprivation under color of any state law, of
any right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution.
45. Local Rule 2.9.1 provides "[a] corporation or unincorporated association
may not appear in any action or proceeding pro se." Gerritsen v. Escovar y Cordova,
No. CV 85-5020, Tentative Ruling at 2 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 8, 1988) (citing C.D. CAL. R.
2.9.1) [hereinafter Tentative Ruling] (order issued pursuant to the Tentative Ruling
on Feb. 8, 1988). The district court had considered Mexico as an unincorporated
organization. Id.
46. 819 F.2d at 1517-18. The Ninth Circuit based subject matter jurisdiction on
§ 1605(a)(5) of the FSIA, which provides for jurisdiction when money damages are
sought for personal injury occurring in the United States that is caused by the tor-
tious act or omission of a foreign state or any official or employee of that foreign
state. The court also found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1351 (1982), which af-
fords jurisdiction of all civil actions and proceedings against consuls or vice consuls
of foreign states. 819 F.2d at 1515.
Plaintiff, in his complaint, alleged subject matter jurisdiction based only on 28
U.S.C. § 1343. Id.; seestapra note 44. The Ninth Circuit noted, however, that in deter-
mining the existence of subject matter jurisdiction the court is not limited to the
jurisdictional statutes identified in the complaint. 819 F.2d at 1515.
47. Gerritsei, 819 F.2d at 1514. Apparently, Mexico was not aware that a sepa-
rate cross-appeal was necessary. Gonzalez-Felix Interview, siqa note 6.
48. Gerpilse,,. 819 F.2d at 1514 n.3. [he Ninth Circuit rejected the Justice De-
partment's recommendation that an official of the Mexican Consul in Los Angeles be
1988] PRO SE FOREIGN SOVEREIGNS 557
On remand, Mexico filed a motion for reconsideration of
the district court's denial of its pro se representation. 4' The dis-
trict court subsequently granted Mexico's motion to proceed
pro se, citing the wide discretion of a district court in interpret-
ing local rules. 50 The court further observed that "because the
policies of the FSIA are best served by allowing pro se status,
the court will allow the UMS [Mexico] to represent itself in this
proceeding."'5' The apparent confusion of the district court in
Gerritsen, coupled with the absence of a rationale based on the
statutory right to proceed pro se, 52 illustrate the lack of a coher-
ent policy regarding pro se representation of foreign sovereigns
in United States federal courts.53
II. PRO SE REPRESENTATION IN UNITED
STATES COURTS
While pro se representation in federal courts is recognized
by statute, it has been limited in scope, particularly with regard
to juridical entities. The policies behind these limitations,
however, do not necessarily extend to foreign sovereign de-
fendants.
A. Limits on Pro Se Representation in the Federal Courts
Although the right to counsel has constitutional underpin-
nings,54 the right to proceed pro se in federal courts is purely
allowed to argue pro hoc vice. Id. The court also rejected the United States Attorney's
argument that the Mexican Consul had a right to appear pursuant to article 5 of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 5, 21 U.S.T. 77, 82-83,
T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 5, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 268. Article 5 of the Convention provides
that consular functions include representing or arranging appropriate representation
for nationals before tribunals in the forum state subject to the practices and proce-
dures of the forum state. Id. The Court stated that it was not consistent with the
practices and procedures of the United States to have individuals who are neither
parties nor attorneys admitted to practice before the federal courts to appear at oral
argument. Gerritsea, 819 F.2d at 1514 n.3; see also infra notes 120-121 and accompany-
ing text. The court made no reference to 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982), which governs pr0
se representation in federal courts. See infra notes 55-65 and accompanying text.
49. Gonzalez-Felix Interview, supra note 6.
50. Tentative Ruling, supra note 45, at 2.
51. Id. at 3.
52. See itfra notes 67-77 and accompanying text.
53. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
54. The sixth amendment of the United States Constitution provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
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statutory.55 The statute provides, in relevant part, "[i]n all
courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct
their own cases personally or by counsel." 56 While pro se ap-
pearances are often involved in the defense of criminal prose-
cutions,5 7 pro se litigants are found in the civil context as well.58
United States courts have almost universally held that cor-
porations,59 partnerships,60 charitable organizations, 6' and un-
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously
ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accu-
sation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel
for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (emphasis added). The right to counsel, however, extends
only to criminal proceedings and not to civil cases. Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp.,
780 F.2d 124, 137 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172 (1986);Jones v. Niagara
Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1983); Caruth v. Pinkney, 683 F.2d
1044, 1048 (7th Cir. 1982) (per curiam), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1214 (1983); O'Reilly
v. New York Times Co., 692 F.2d 863, 867 (2d Cir. 1982).
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982).
56. Id. The full text of the statute reads, "In all courts of the United States the
parties may plead and conduct their own cases personally or by counsel as, by the
rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein." 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1982). Pro se pleadings are held to less stringent stan-
dards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers and are to be construed liberally.
Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972).
Pro se litigants are expected to abide by the rules of the court in which they liti-
gate. Carter v. Commissioner, 784 F.2d 1006, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 1986). In addition,
pro se litigants must comply with substantive and procedural law. King v. Atiyeh, 814
F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987); Brown v. Frey, 806 F.2d 801, 804 (8th Cir. 1986).
57. See infra note 65. See generally Note, The Right to Appear in Proper Person in the
Federal Courts, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 753 (1963).
58. See sources cited supra note 57.
59. Osborne v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738, 830 (1824);Jones v. Niagara
Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1983); Strong Delivery Ministry
Ass'n v. Board of Appeals, 543 F.2d 32, 34 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Shapiro,
Bernstein & Co. v. Continental Record Co., 386 F.2d 426, 427 (2d Cir. 1967).
A few courts have created exceptions to the rule. In one case, the sole share-
holder of a corporation was allowed to proceed pro se on behalf of the corporation
because neither the shareholder nor the corporation could afford an attorney, and to
require the corporation to appear by an attorney would effectively exclude it and its
sole shareholder from the courts. The court based its exception on the inherent
power of a court to supervise the proper administration of justice in bankruptcy
cases. In re Holliday's Tax Servs., 417 F. Supp. 182, 184 (E. D.N.Y. 1976), affd without
opinion sub norn. Holliday's Tax Servs. v. Hampton, 614 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1979). In
another case, DeVilliers v. Atlas Corp., 360 F.2d 292, 294 (10th Cir. 1966). the court
noted that appellant's status as an attorney was uncertain and reiterated its holding in
Flora Construction Co. v. Fireman's Fund Insurance Co., 307 F.2d 413 (10th Cir.).
cert. denied, 371 U.S. 950, reh g denied, 373 U.S. 240 (1962), that a corporation may
appear in court only by an attorney. It is unclear why the court allowed pro se repre-
sentation of the corporation in Del'illiers.
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incorporated organizations 62 cannot proceed pro se because
they are artificial legal persons and cannot appear for them-
selves personally.63 Since a natural person must necessarily
represent these types of organizations in court, United States
federal courts have required that such persons be attorneys li-
censed to practice law.6 4 Moreover, it has been firmly estab-
lished that only a person licensed to practice law may represent
anyone other than himself in court proceedings. 65 This wide-
60. S. Stern & Co. v. United States, 331 F.2d 310, 315 (Fed. Cir. 1963), cert.
denied, 377 U.S. 909 (1964); First Amendment Found. v. Village of Brookfield, 575 F.
Supp. 1207, 1207 (N.D. Il1. 1983). But see United States v. Reeves, 431 F.2d 1187,
1188 (9th Cir. 1970) (per curiam) (where the United States government sues to fore-
close partnership property, and state law gives each partner a specific right to prop-
erty, then an individual partner may appear pro se because he is pleading his own
case).
61. A reverend, who was president and founder, was not allowed to represent
his organization in a tax proceeding. Strong Delivery Ministry Ass'n v. Board of Ap-
peals, 543 F.2d 32, 34 (7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); see also Lindstrom v. Illinois, 632
F. Supp. 1535, 1538 (N.D. Il. 1986) (a clergyman, who was not a licensed attorney,
could not represent his church), dismissed without opinion, 828 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1987).
But see Church of the Visible Intelligence that Governs the Universe v. United States,
226 Ct. Cl. 529, 533-34 (1981) (where the court was unsure whether the church con-
sisted only of defendant and his revelation or whether there were other members, the
court allowed defendant to proceed pro se).
62. MOVE Org. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 555 F. Supp. 684, 693 (E.D.
Pa. 1983).
63. Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F. Supp. 451, 476 (N.D. Tex. 1975), aff'd
sub norm. Pilla v. American Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir: 1976).
64. See, e.g., Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir.
1983); Turner, 407 F. Supp. at 476.
65. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. Section 1654 of title 28, en-
acted to enforce the sixth amendment's guarantees to right to counsel, has been spe-
cifically construed to allow for only two types of representation: that by an attorney
admitted to the practice of law by a governmental body and that by a person repre-
senting himself. Turner, 407 F. Supp. at 476.
The statute has also been construed to grant a right of pro se representation only
to individuals. See Russell v. United States, 308 F.2d 78, 79 (9th Cir. 1962); Collins v.
O'Brien, 208 F.2d 44, 45 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 944, reh 'g denied, 347
U.S. 970 (1954); Sermor, Inc. v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 1, 5 (1987). A sole share-
holder may not represent his corporation unless he is an attorney licensed to practice
law. National Indep. Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 748 F.2d
602, 609 (11 th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1056 (1985). But see In re Holliday's
Tax Servs., 417 F. Supp. 182, 184 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff d without opinion sub norm. Hol-
liday's Tax Servs. v. Hampton, 614 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir. 1979).
A corporation may not be represented pro se by its president or officers. Richdel,
Inc. v. Sunspool Corp., 699 F.2d 1366, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (per curiam); South-
west Express Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm., 670 F.2d 53, 55 (5th Cir. 1982);
James v. Daley, 406 F. Supp. 645, 648 (D. Del. 1976). A spouse cannot act as a
representative for his or her spouse and be accorded pro se status without being a
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spread and venerable rule has even been applied to an individ-
ual acting on the behalf of the United States government.66
B. The Policies Behind the Limitations
The requirement that an attorney appear for corporations
and other organizations in United States federal courts is a
practice that can be traced back to the common law.6 7 The
rule protects courts "from pleadings awkwardly drafted and
motions inarticulately presented. '68 As most courts have ex-
perienced first-hand, the conduct of litigation by a non-lawyer
often creates unusual burdens for his adversaries and for the
licensed attorney. Lindstrom v. Illinois, 632 F. Supp. 1535, 1537 (N.D. Ill. 1986),
dismissed without opinion, 828 F.2d 21 (7th Cir. 1987).
A prisoner may not represent a fellow prisoner pro se. Herrera-Venegas v.
Sanchez-Rivera, 681 F.2d 41, 42 (1st Cir. 1982); cf. United States v. Wilhelm, 570
F.2d 461, 465 (3d Cir. 1978) (a criminal defendant has no right to be represented by
a friend who is not an attorney).
There is no right to hybrid or dual representation (simultaneous self-representa-
tion and representation by counsel). Munz v. Fayram, 626 F. Supp. 197, 198 (N.D.
Iowa 1985) (criminal proceeding), dismissed without opinion, 786 F.2d 1169 (8th Cir.
1986); Lanigan v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 609 F. Supp. 1000, 1002 (N.D. Ill. 1985) (civil
proceeding). But see United States v. Coupez, 603 F.2d 1347, 1351 (9th Cir. 1979)
(the court has discretion in pro se proceedings to appoint "standby" counsel to advise
or assist a criminal defendant).
A trustee who is not an attorney cannot represent his trust pro se. C.E. Pope
Equity Trust v. United States, 818 F.2d 696, 697 (9th Cir. 1987).
A minor child cannot bring suit through a parent acting as next friend if the
parent is not represented by an attorney. Meeker v. Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 154
(10th Cir. 1986).
A non-attorney pro se litigant may not attempt to represent others in a purported
class action. McShane v. United States, 366 F.2d 286, 288 (9th Cir. 1966).
66. In United States v. Onan, 190 F.2d 1, 6-7 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869
(1951), the court held that a statute providing that a suit to recover damages for
fraud committed against the United States may be brought and carried on by "an%
person" did not authorize a layman to carry on a suit as an attorney for the United
States. Rather, the court stated that only a person licensed to practice law could
conduct proceedings in court for anyone other than himself. 190 F.2d at 6-7. It is
important to note that the court's decision was based on former 31 U.S.C § 232, Act
of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, sec. 1, § 3491, 57 Stat. 608, 608-09 (current version at 31
U.S.C.A. §§ 3730-3731 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988)), and 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1982), and
not on 28 U.S.C. § 1654.
67. Brandstein v. White Lamps, Inc., 20 F. Supp. 369, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
68. Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373, 375 (3d Cir. 1966); see alo
Heiskell v. Mozie, 82 F.2d 861, 863 (D.C. Cir. 1936) (en banc) (the rule "arises out of
the necessity, in the proper administration of justice, of having legal proceedings
carried on according to the rules of law and the practice of courts and by those
charged with the responsibility of legal knowledge and professional duty").
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court""' and can have a disruptive effect on the litigation pro-
cess.
70
Although pro se litigants are subject to Rule 11 of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure,7' pro se litigants are not bound by
many of the attorney's ethical responsibilities, 72 such as avoid-
ing unwarranted or vexatious claims or refraining from dila-
tory tactics.73 Inasmuch as attorneys, who have been qualified
and admitted to practice, are officers of the court, they are sub-
ject to its control. 4 It is also recognized that most organiza-
tions, particularly corporations, are entities separate from the
individuals who participate in their functioning and that the in-
dividual's interests may not necessarily coincide with those of
the organization. 75 It has been noted that in choosing the ad-
vantages of incorporation, an individual must also accept the
69. Jones v. Niagara Frontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1983). As
one court noted:
The rules for admission to practice law in the Courts . . . require the appli-
cant to submit to an examination to test not only his knowledge and ability,
but also his honesty and integrity, and the purpose behind these require-
ments is the protection of the public and the courts from the consequences
of ignorance or venality.
Heiskell, 82 F.2d at 863.
70. National Indep. Theatre Exhibitors, Inc. v. Buena Vista Distrib. Co., 748
F.2d 602, 610 (11 th Cir. 1984) (a complicated antitrust case demands skilled attor-
neys), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1056 (1985).
71. FED. R. Civ. P. 11; see, e.g., Day v. Amoco Chems. Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1120,
1122-23 (S.D. Tex.), dismissed without opinion, 747 F.2d 1462 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1086, reh'g denied, 471 U.S. 1095 (1985); see also infra note 131 and
accompanying text.
72. Jones, 722 F.2d at 22.
73. See THE LAWYER'S CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(l)-
(2) (1978); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 (1984).
The American Bar Association functions as a self-regulating body by adopting
professional standards that serve as models of the regulatory law governing the legal
profession. Violation of established standards may result in disciplinary action rang-
ing from censure to disbarment. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, supra,
at ix-13.
74. See Turner v. American Bar Ass'n, 407 F.Supp. 451, 476 (N.D. Tex. 1975),
aff'd sub nom. Pilla v. American Bar Ass'n, 542 F.2d 56 (8th Cir. 1976); MacNeil v.
Hearst Corp., 160 F. Supp. 157, 159 (D. Del. 1958); Brandstein v. White Lamps, Inc.,
20 F. Supp. 369, 370 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
75. See Strong Delivery Ministry Ass'n v. Board of Appeals, 543 F.2d 32, 34 (7th
Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Church of the Visible Intelligence that Governs the Universe
v. United States, 226 Ct. Cl. 529, 533 (1981); H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF
CORPORATIONS 144-45 (3d ed. 1983).
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burdens of incorporation.76
Because the policy limitations on pro se representation ex-
ist for the protection of the court, violation of the rule is ap-
propriately raised sua sponte.77
III. THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN AS A PRO SE LITIGANT
Requiring foreign states to be represented by United
States lawyers in United States courts to assert claims of sover-
eign immunity directly contradicts a policy and practice recog-
nized by both United States and international law. Sovereign
defendants should be allowed to proceed pro se unless the effi-
cient administration of justice is compromised.
A. The Case for Pro Se Representation of Foreign
Sovereign Defendants
1. Pro Se Representation and United States Case Law
The right of a sovereign nation to appear in United States
courts through its accredited representatives was explicitly rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court in 1921 in Ex parte Muir.78 In
Muir, a British Government vessel was involved in a collision at
sea with an Italian vessel. 79 The British Government at-
tempted to assert a defense of sovereign immunity through
private counsel acting as amicus curiae.8 0 The Court refused
to determine immunity based upon a mere suggestion made by
private counsel appearing as amicus curiae on behalf of the
British Embassy.8" Rather, the Court stated that, as of right,
the British Government was entitled to appear in the suit to
assert its jurisdictional claim or to have its accredited and rec-
ognized representative appear to protect the sovereign's inter-
ests. 82
A few years later, the Supreme Court reiterated its recog-
nition of the sovereign's right to appear through its represent-
76. Mercu-Ray Indus. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 392 F. Supp. 16, 19 (S.D.N.Y.), aft'd,
508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1974).
77. See, e.g., MOVE Org. v. United States Dep't ofJustice, 555 F. Supp. 684, 693
n.33 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
78. 254 U.S. 522 (1921).
79. Id. at 527.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 532.
82. Id.
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atives in Berizzi Bros. v. S.S. Pesaro" and Compania Espanola de
Navegacion Maritima, S.A. v. The Navemar.84 In Pesaro, the Italian
ambassador to the United States appeared on behalf of the
Italian Government and successfully asserted a defense of sov-
ereign immunity.85 Similarly, in Navemar, the Spanish ambas-
sador to the United States challenged the district court's juris-
diction on the basis of sovereign immunity. 86 The Supreme
Court again stated that a foreign government was entitled to
raise the jurisdictional question in its own name or through an
accredited representative.87 More recently, in Victory Transport
Inc. v. Comisaria General,8 the Second Circuit stated that "the
accredited and recognized representative of the foreign sover-
eign may present the claim of sovereign immunity directly to the
court."8 9 These cases are not necessarily dispositive, however,
because the courts did not specifically address the issue of pro
se representation by a foreign state.9
Section 71 of the Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Re-
lations Law of the United States provides that an assertion of
immunity may be made "by the government of the foreign
state or its accredited diplomatic representative upon an ap-
pearance before the court."'" The Restatement specifically
83. 271 U.S. 562, 570-71 (1926) (determining immunity of Italian vessel).
84. 303 U.S. 68, 74 (1938) (determining immunity of Spanish vessel).
85. Pesaro, 271 U.S. at 570.
86. Navemar, 303 U.S. at 70-71.
87. Id. at 74.
88. 336 F.2d 354, 358 (2d Cir. 1964) (agreement to arbitrate in New York con-
stituted a consent to jurisdiction where the Spanish general consul chartered a vessel
to transport cargo to Spain), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 934 (1965).
89. 336 F.2d at 358 (emphasis added). However, in Victoiy Transport, the Second
Circuit was apparently disturbed by the Spanish Consul's lack of specific authority
from his government to interpose a claim of sovereign immunity. Id. at 358-59 n.7.
90. The foreign state in each of these cases was represented by U.S. counsel. See
Aavenar, 303 U.S. at 70; Pesaro, 271 U.S. at 565; Muir, 254 U.S. at 523; Victory Trans-
port, 336 F.2d at 355. These cases are ambiguous because it is not clear whether the
courts, in referring to the "representative" of a foreign state, meant a diplomatic
representative or a legal representative.
91. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 71(l)(b) (1965) [hereinafter SECOND RESTATEMENT]; see also RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES ch. 5, at 392 (1987)
[hereinafter THIRD RESTATEMENT]. The Third Restatement, which became available
in 1988, does not purport to supersede the Second Restatement. However, in the
event of any inconsistency between the two, the Third Restatement is authoritative.
Telephone interview with Louis Henkin, Chief Reporter, Restatement (Third) of the
Foreign Relations Law of the United States (May 9, 1988). Citations to the Second
1988]
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prescribes that when a foreign state asserts immunity on its
own behalf in federal court, it must do so by "an accredited
diplomatic representative or by counsel acting for it."" 2
As indicated by Muir and its progeny, immunity was gen-
erally asserted in United States courts by a special appearance
of the state that was being sued."3 The State Department's
practice of making a suggestion of immunity to the court de-
veloped later as an alternative method of claiming immunity.94
Thus, while the FSIA largely discontinued the State Depart-
ment's role in immunity determinations, it seems clear that the
FSIA did not specifically overturn the previously established
procedure by which claims of immunity could be presented di-
rectly to a court by a foreign state's representative.95
2. The Legislative Intent of the FSIA and
Pro Se Representation
Allowing foreign sovereigns to proceed pro se in United
States courts to contest jurisdictional issues is consistent with
the purposes of the FSIA since "[t]he broad purposes of this
legislation [are] to facilitate and depoliticize litigation against
foreign states and to minimize irritations in foreign relations
arising out of such litigation. '96 If foreign sovereigns do not
retain U.S. counsel because of the attendant financial burden
and are not afforded the opportunity to proceed pro se, there is
greater likelihood of default judgments being entered against
foreign nations.97 Clearly, such situations would fail to "facili-
tate and depoliticize litigation against foreign states."9 Fur'
Restatement in this Note are neither incorporated nor controverted in the Third Re-
statement, and thus remain valid.
92. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 71 comment b (emphasis added).
93. See supra notes 78-87 and accompanying text.
94. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, ch. 5, at 392; supra notes 78-87 and ac-
companying text.
95. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
96. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 5, at 45 (letter from Robert S. Ingersoll,
Deputy Secretary of State, and Harold R. Tyler Jr., Deputy Attorney General to the
Honorable Carl 0. Albert, Speaker of the House of Representatives) (Oct. 31, 1975),
reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 6634.
97. See supra note 24. The FSIA provides for the attachment and execution of
property of a foreign state in very limited and specific circumstances. See 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1609-1611 (1982).
98. H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 5, at 45, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 6634.
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ther, if a default judgment is not entered against the foreign
sovereign, the plaintiff has no recourse whatsoever. Under the
FSIA, courts can enter default judgments against foreign states
only when the claimant demonstrates his right to relief by "evi-
dence satisfactory to the court."99 Thus, encouraging foreign
sovereigns to appear by allowing pro se representation benefits
plaintiffs as well as foreign states.
The United States Department of Justice favors pro se rep-
resentation by foreign states on the ground that it will improve
implementation of the FSIA. l00 Abraham D. Sofaer, Legal Ad-
visor of the Department of State, supports pro se representation
by foreign states in United States courts.' 0 ' Judge Sofaer, in a
declaration to the District Court in Gerritsen, stated that requir-
ing foreign states to obtain U.S. counsel will "materially hinder
our [the State Department's] continuing efforts and the consid-
erable progress we have made in convincing foreign govern-
ments to comply with the system established by the FSIA."'' 02
Thus, those departments of the U.S. Government best ac-
quainted with the problems faced by foreign sovereigns in U.S.
courts favor permitting foreign nations to appear pro se.
3. Considerations of Comity and Pro Se Representation
It is generally recognized that a state may not unreason-
ably restrict the opportunity of another state to raise the issue
of immunity.10 3 Under the FSIA, foreign states may assert a
defense of sovereign immunity only by appearing in a United
States court.' 4 If sovereign defendants are required to make
an appearance only by U.S. counsel, the attendant financial
burden of employing U.S. lawyers might preclude foreign
99. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e) (1982).
100. United States' Memorandum in Support of Mexico's Motion for Leave to
Appear Pro Se at 7, Gerritsen v. de la Madrid Hurtado (C.D. Cal. filed Jan. 28, 1988)
(No. CV85-5020) [hereinafter United States Memorandum].
101. Id. at 14. The State Department, for practical reasons, prefers that foreign
governments retain U.S. counsel. Id.
102. Id. at 15.
103. Section 65(2) of the Second Restatement provides, "A state may require
another state . . . to take certain procedural steps as a condition of immunity, but
such a requirement must not unreasonably restrict the opportunity of the other state
effectively to assert its immunity." SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 65(2).
104. See supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text.
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states from asserting a defense of sovereign immunity.11
5
In addition, many nations allow their foreign ministries to
appear in their domestic courts to assert immunity on behalf of
foreign states,"" as was the practice of the United States prior
to the FSIA.' °7 Such nations perceive a lack of reciprocity in
the United States because they are required to hire attorneys
to appear in U.S. courts while the United States need not do so
in their courts.' 0 8
With regard to Mexico, in particular, it is interesting to
note that Mexican law would not require the United States to
obtain Mexican counsel to appear in a Mexican court to assert
a defense of sovereign immunity. 109 However, the Department
of Justice always retains foreign counsel to represent the
United States in foreign courts as a matter of policy and prac-
tice.''o To require Mexico to retain U.S. lawyers to appear in
federal courts might present problems of comity and mutual
respect between co-equal sovereigns,' I as Mexico extends the
option of self-representation to the United States.
4. Due Process Considerations
Although foreign states do not generally enjoy rights as
"persons" under the United States Constitution, they are af-
forded procedural due process. 1 2 A number of courts have
held that the language used in the FSIA incorporates the stan-
dard set out in International Shoe Co. v. Washington "1 regarding
the minimum contacts with the forum that are necessary to sat-
isfy due process requirements." 4 Due process requires that a
105. See supra notes 6-7, 30-32 and accompanying text.
106. United States Memorandum, supra note 100, at 8.
107. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
108. United States Memorandum, supra note 100, at 8.
109. See Gonzalez-Felix Interview, supra note 6.
.110. Telephone Interview with David Epstein, Director, Office of Foreign Litiga-
tion, Civil Division, United States Department of Justice (Jan. 20, 1988).
111. Comity is a general concept involving the mutual respect of the laws and
institutions among nations. See generally 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW § 19C,
at 33-35 (H. Lauterpacht 8th ed. 1955). Comity has been defined as "the rules of
politeness, convenience, and goodwill observed by the States in their natural inter-
course without being legally bound by them." Id. at 34 n. 1.
112. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 453 comment c & reporters' note 3;
id. § 721 comment I & reporters' note 6.
113. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
114. See Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421,
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deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by both
notice and an opportunity for a hearing." 15 Although due pro-
cess is a flexible concept, it must ensure fundamental fair-
ness. 116
A foreign sovereign defendant arguably has a property in-
terest at stake when it is sued in United States courts. A failure
to appear could result in a default judgment with subsequent
execution against the sovereign's property in the United
States.' To require a foreign state to appear only by a U.S.
attorney might effectively exclude the foreign state from the
court."' 8 If the financial burden of retaining U.S. counsel pre-
cludes foreign states from appearing each time they are sued in
the United States, foreign states would arguably be denied an
opportunity for a hearing and, afortiori, procedural due pro-
cess. Such a result seems especially harsh since the foreign
sovereign defendant bears the ultimate burden of proving that
it is immune from the jurisdiction of the court.' '9
5. Pro Se Representation and International Agreements
Pro se representation is compatible with existing interna-
tional agreements. Article 3 of the Vienna Convention on Dip-
lomatic Relations defines the functions of a diplomatic mis-
sion, inter alia, as "(a) representing the sending State in the re-
ceiving State; (b) protecting in the receiving State the interests
428 (2d Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 56 U.S.L.W. 3712 (U.S. Apr. 18, 1988) (No. 87-
1372); Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300,
313 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1148 (1982); Carey v. National Oil Corp.,
592 F.2d 673, 676 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam); Wyle v. Bank Melli of Tehran, 577 F.
Supp. 1148, 1159-60 (N.D. Cal. 1983).
Although the meaning and scope of due process has developed mostly in the
application of the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment governing state
action, due process has essentially the same meaning and scope in the fifth amend-
ment as applied to the federal government. See, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S.
188, 198-200 (1982); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332-35 (1976): see also
THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 453 reporters' note 3.
115. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950).
116. Walters v. National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 320 (1984).
117. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1608-1611 (1982); supra notes 24, 97.
118. This same rationale was the basis of an exception in allowing a corporation
to proceed pro se. See In re Holliday's Tax Servs., 417 F. Supp. 182 (E.D.N.Y. 1976),
aff'd without opinion sub non. Holliday's Tax Servs. v. Hampton, 614 F.2d 1287 (2d Cir.
1979); see also supra note 59.
119. See supra notes 22-24 and accompanying text.
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of the sending State." 12( Appearing in court to assert a de-
fense of sovereign immunity certainly falls within the purview
of protecting the interests of the sending state. Similarly, arti-
cle 5 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations states
that consular functions consist of "protecting in the receiving
State the interests of the sending State and of its nationals,
both individuals and bodies corporate." 121 Representing the
sovereign seems well within the stated functions of a consulate.
The policy limitations on pro se representation are not nec-
essarily applicable to foreign nations because foreign nations
are fundamentally different from corporations and other orga-
nizations. 122 The underlying rationale for limiting pro se repre-
sentation is to protect the courts and legal entities from un-
scrupulous or incompetent representation. 2 3  While these
considerations might be entirely appropriate in the case of cor-
porations and other organizations appearing pro se through a
non-attorney agent, they are misplaced when applied to for-
eign sovereigns.
It is generally recognized that a corporation, as an artifi-
cial entity composed of natural persons, has interests distin-
120. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961, art. 3, 23
U.S.T. 3227, 3231-32, T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 5-6, 500 U.N.T.S. 95, 98. The United
States and Mexico are both parties to this agreement. 23 U.S.T. at 3419, 3432,
T.I.A.S. No. 7502, at 193, 206, 500 U.N.T.S. at 193, 201.
121. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1963, art. 5, 21 U.S.T.
77, 82, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at 6, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, 268. The United States and Mex-
ico are both parties to this agreement. 21 U.S.T. at 361, 369, T.I.A.S. No. 6820, at
285, 293, 596 U.N.T.S. at 440, 451.
122. While a corporation is an artificial legal person created by state law, a for-
eign state "is an entity which has a defined territory and permanent population,
under the control of its own government, and which engages in, or has the capacity
to engage in, formal relations with other such entities." THIRD RESTATEMENT, sapra
note 91, § 201; see also I. BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 74-75; H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 75, at 147;J. STARKE, INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 91-92 (9th ed.
1984).
Traditional corporate attributes include: "(a) Power to take, hold and convev
property in the corporate name; (b) Power to sue and to be sued in the corporate
name; (c) Centralization of management in the board of directors; (d) Ready transfer-
ability of interests; (e) Perpetual succession; and (f) Limited liability." H. HENN &J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 75, at 147. Some of these attributes inhere in unincorporated
business enterprises as well. Id.
As the respective characteristics would indicate, foreign states and corporations
are not, by their very nature, comparable.
123. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
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guishable from the interests of its individual members. 24
However, the same cannot generally be said of a foreign sover-
eign and its duly authorized and accredited representatives.
Since heads of state, heads of government, and ministers of
foreign affairs are recognized representatives of their state for
treaty negotiation purposes, 125 they also seem to be appropri-
ate representatives of their state in United States courts. It
would be unwise, if not officious, for United States courts to
require a sovereign to take measures, such as obtaining coun-
sel, to protect itself from the ostensibly separate interests of its
own designated representatives. 12
6
B. Evening the Odds: What Foreign Sovereigns Can Do
There are several ways a foreign state can prepare itself to
proceed pro se in United States courts to assert a defense of
sovereign immunity. For example, a foreign nation could send
one or more of its nationals, perhaps foreign ministry employ-
ees, to special programs to familiarize themselves with the
American legal system. 127
In addition, foreign states could develop a basic litigation
manual outlining both the procedural and substantive aspects
of the FSIA. A manual describing the intricacies of the FSIA
would be very helpful because the Act is so comprehensive and
detailed.'28 Mexico, for one, hired a U.S. law firm to prepare
124. See Strong Delivery Ministry Ass'n v. Board of Appeals, 543 F.2d 32, 34
(7th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); Church of the Visible Intelligence that Governs the
Universe v. United States, 226 Ct. CI. 529, 533 (1981); H. HENN &J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 75, at 144-45.
125. THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 311 comment b. Heads of diplo-
matic missions are regarded as possessing like powers within their jurisdiction. Id.
126. Carl, supra note 23, at 1058.
127. For example, Fordham University School of Law offers a one-year program
(24 credits minimum) for foreign lawyers. Completion of the program allows foreign
lawyers to sit for the New York State Bar Exam pursuant to rule 520.5 of the New
York Court of Appeals, N.Y. COMP. CODE & REGS. tit. 22, § 520.5 (1986). FORDHAM
UNIV. SCHOOL OF LAW, BULLETIN 1987-1988, at 43 (1987).
Mexico, for example, sent one of its foreign ministry employees to the University
of Houston Law Center for a Master of Laws degree in 1984. Gonzalez-Felix Inter-
view, supra note 6. That employee is currently Coordinator General for Litigation
Abroad. Id. Mexico has subsequently sent four additional foreign ministry employ-
ces to United States law schools. Id.
128. For example, a petition to remove a case from state court must be filed with
the appropriate district court within 60 days according to 28 U.S.C. § 1608(d) unless
good cause is shown pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1982). Thus, failing to petition
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such a manual. 129 Also, most district courts have a pro se clerk
who can provide procedural advice. 3 '
Further, when a foreign state does prevail in asserting a
defense of sovereign immunity and the claim appears to have
been unwarranted, frivolous, or otherwise without merit, the
foreign state should request that the court impose sanctions on
the plaintiff under Rule 1 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure. "3 ' Such a motion, particularly if successful, might serve
as a deterrent for future groundless claims against the foreign
state. Unfortunately, the FSIA contains no specific fee or cost
provisions as are provided in other statutes. 3 2
Finally, it seems clear that foreign states lack the option of
having one of their lawyers proceed pro hac vice, '3 3 whereby a
lawyer admitted to a bar of one state may be admitted to prac-
tice in another jurisdiction for a particular case. Most local
rules of the federal courts require a pro hac vice applicant to be
to remove within 60 days without good cause will result in a forfeiture of the foreign
sovereign defendant's right to remove. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1446, 1608 (1982); see also
H.R. REP. No. 1487, supra note 5, at 32, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE & ADMIN. NEws at
6631.
129. Gonzalez-Felix Interview, supra note 6.
130. Telephone interview with Lisa Evans, Pro Se Clerk, Eastern District of New
York (Jan. 29, 1988) (Pro Se Clerks are attorneys).
131. Rule II allows "an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to
pay the other party or parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred be-
cause of the filing of the pleading, motion, or other paper, including a reasonable
attorney's fee.". FED. R. Civ. P. 11. Although unlikely to occur, an interesting foreign
relations problem might arise if a foreign sovereign were to be sanctioned under
Rule II. In effect, a United States court would be sanctioning the government of a
foreign country.
132. See, e.g., Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986); Consumer Credit Protection (Truth in Lending) Act § 130, 15
U.S.C. § 1640 (1982); Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1988 (1982).
Most courts decline to award attorney's fees to pro se litigants. See Cunningham
v. FBI, 664 F.2d 383, 384-88 (3d Cir. 1981) (Freedom of Information Act); Lovell v.
Snow, 637 F.2d 170, 171 (ist Cir. 1981) (Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act);
Hannon v. Security Nat'l Bank, 537 F.2d 327, 328 (9th Cir. 1976) (Truth in Lending
Act). But see Cox v. United States Dep't of Justice, 601 F.2d 1, 5-6 (D.C. Cir. 1979)
(Freedom of Information Act).
However, the fact that a pro se litigant is not entitled to attorney's fees does not
mean he is not entitled to some form of compensation for his adversary's miscon-
duct. In re Emergency Beacon Corp., 52 Bankr. 979, 996 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985); see
a/so supra note 131 and accompanying text.
133. Pro hac vice literally means "for this one particular occasion." BLACK'S LAW%
DICTIONARY, su/ra note 1, at 1091.
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a member in good standing of a United States bar.134
C. Factors for Judicial Consideration in According Pro Se Status
Despite the reasons supporting pro se representation by
foreign sovereign defendants, consideration must be afforded
for judicial economy. There may be situations in which it is
simply not practical or prudent for a court to allow a foreign
sovereign to proceed pro se. If a court finds itself inundated
with "pleadings awkwardly drafted and motions inarticulately
presented"' 3 5 by a pro se foreign sovereign defendant, the
court should retain the discretion to deny pro se representation
either by motion or sua sponte 13
6
If a determination of sovereign immunity involves only a
question of law, such as an interpretation of one of the provi-
sions in the FSIA, then the foreign state should be allowed to
proceed pro se. 137 Pro se representation also seems to be appro-
priate where there is a basic factual dispute between the par-
ties, such as whether or not the foreign state has waived its
immunity. However, in cases where it appears that a determi-
nation of sovereign immunity would involve a full trial on the
merits with complex issues of fact and law, pro se representation
may not be practical. 13s Courts should also consider the com-
plexity of the substantive law at issue as well as potential
problems involving discovery. 3 9
134. See, e.g., E.D. CAL. R. 180(b)(2); D. CONN. R. 2(a)-(d);' S.D. FLA. R. 1-2;
E.D.N.Y. R. 2(a)-(c); S.D.N.Y. R. 2(a)-(c).
135. Simbraw, Inc. v. United States, 367 F.2d 373, 375 (3d Cir. 1966).
136. See, e.g., MOVE Org. v. United States Dep't of Justice, 555 F. Supp. 684,
693 n.33 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
137. For example, if the issue involves an application of any of the definitions in
§ 1603 of the Act, then it would be appropriate to allow the foreign state to proceed
pro se. Other situations might include the exceptions listed in § 1605(a). For in-
stance, under § 1603(a)(3), a foreign state is not immune from jurisdiction if rights in
property taken in violation of international law are at issue. If the only issue before
the court is whether international law was violated in the taking of the property, then
pro se representation would be appropriate. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1603, 1605 (1982).
138. Comment c to § 65 of the Second Restatement provides that where a for-
eign state is entitled to immunity, consideration of the merits of the claim presented
by the plaintiff is barred. SECOND RESTATEMENT, supra note 91, § 65 comment c. Sec-
tion 71 provides that the sovereign's immunity claim may only be asserted if it does
not place the merits of the controversy in issue. Id. § 71. In addition, a claim of
immunity is ineffective if made after the merits of the claim have been placed in issue
by the foreign state. Id.
139. Discovery can present a number of problems tor foreign sovereign defend-
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CONCLUSION
Foreign sovereigns should be permitted to proceed pro se
in United States federal courts to contest jurisdictional issues
under the FSIA. Mexico's experience demonstrates that pro se
representation is a viable and feasible alternative to the finan-
cial burden of employing U.S. lawyers. Despite the propriety
of pro se representation for foreign sovereign defendants,
United States federal courts must be afforded discretion to
deny pro se status in those limited situations where it would be
prudent and judicious to do so.
Susan E. Craig*
ants both because of its complexity and intrusiveness. For a brief discussion of dis-
covery in the context of the FSIA, see Gonzalez-Felix, supra note 19, at 33-34; see also
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